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1 
Administrative Detention of Terrorists:  
Why Detain, and Detain Whom? 
Matthew C. Waxman* 
INTRODUCTION 
A debate rages in the halls of universities as well as in Congress and 
national security agencies about whether the United States should enact 
new “administrative” or “preventive” detention laws – laws that would 
authorize the detention of suspected terrorists outside the normal criminal 
justice system.1  Advocates argue that criminal law alone is inadequate to 
combat transnational terrorist networks spanning continents and waging 
violence at a level of intensity and sophistication previously achievable 
only by powerful states, but that the law of war is inadequate to protect 
liberty.2  Jack Goldsmith and Neal Katyal, for example, call on “Congress 
to establish a comprehensive system of preventive detention that is 
overseen by a national security court.”3  Critics warn that new 
administrative detention laws will undermine liberty, and they assert that 
criminal law already provides the government with ample tools to arrest, 
 
 * Associate Professor, Columbia Law School; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on 
Foreign Relations; Member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and 
Law.  Thanks to Ken Anderson, Bobby Chesney, David Cole, Justin Florence, Matthew 
Gerke, Neal Katyal, Jack Goldsmith, Aziz Huq, Trevor Morrison, Samuel Rascoff, Gabor 
Rona, Steve Vladeck, and Benjamin Wittes for comments on earlier drafts.  This article 
elaborates on a paper commissioned by the Brookings Institution for a workshop on 
counterterrorism and statutory law. 
 1. On July 27, 2008, the Washington Post editorial page called for “a specialized 
national security court” that would “assess whether [the] government was justified in 
detaining a suspect,” Workable Terrorism Trials, WASH. POST, July 27, 2008, at B6, opposite 
an opinion piece by a federal judge arguing that such a proposal “risks a grave error in 
creating a parallel system of terrorism courts unmoored from the constitutional values that 
have served our country so well for so long.”  John C. Coughenour, Op-Ed., The Right Place 
to Try Terrorism Cases, WASH. POST, July 27, 2008, at B7. 
 2. See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR 151-182 (2008); Andrew 
McCarthy & Alykhan Velshi, We Need a National Security Court (2006) (unpublished 
White Paper submitted to American Enterprise Institute, available at http://wsprod1. 
webrecruiter.com/fdd2/images/stories/national%20security%20court.pdf); Amos N. Guiora, 
Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigm for the Detention of Terrorists, 19 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 511 (2007); Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terror One Terrorist at a Time: A 
Noncriminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 149 (2005); Benjamin Wittes & Mark Gitenstein, A Legal 
Framework for Detaining Terrorists (Brookings Institution, Opportunity 08 Paper, 2008), 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/~/media/Files/Projects/Opportunity08/ 
PB_Terrorism_Wittes.pdf;  Jack Goldsmith, Long-Term Detention and Our National 
Security Court (Brookings Institution, Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/ 
papers/2009/0209_detention_goldsmith.aspx. 
 3. Jack Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 
11, 2007, at A19. 
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charge, and prosecute suspected terrorists.4  Center for Constitutional Rights 
President Michael Ratner writes that preventive detention “cuts the heart 
out of any concept of human liberty.”5 
This debate has only intensified since the Supreme Court held last Term 
in Boumediene v. Bush that prisoners at Guantánamo have a constitutional 
right to habeas corpus review of their detention.6  The Court expressly left 
unresolved important substantive questions such as the scope of the 
Executive’s power to detain,7 and delegated to lower courts resolution of 
the procedural issues likely to arise in hundreds of resulting habeas 
petitions.8  Administrative detention proponents argue that these openings 
invite Congress to enact legislation to clarify the uncertainties, recognizing 
that the modern-day terrorist threat necessitates new legal tools.9  Critics 
draw the opposite lesson from Boumediene.  A week after the decision 
came down, the bipartisan Constitution Project published a report 
condemning administrative detention proposals, arguing that Boumediene 
“illustrates [that] existing Article III courts are fully capable of adjudicating 
issues regarding the legality of detention.  There is no need to create a 
specialized tribunal either for Guantanamo detainees or for anyone else who 
may be subject to detention under existing law.”10 
This article aims to reframe the administrative detention debate, not to 
resolve it.  In doing so, however, it aspires to advance the discussion by 
highlighting the critical substantive choices embedded in calls for legal 
 
 4. See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, After Guantánamo: The Case Against Preventive 
Detention, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June 2008, at  2; Gabor Rona, Legal Frameworks to 
Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of Existing Tools, 5 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 499 (2004-
2005); Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting 
Terrorism Cases in Federal Court (Human Rights First, White Paper, 2008), http://www. 
humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf;  THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, A 
CRITIQUE OF “NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS” (2008), available at http://www.constitution 
project.org/pdf/Critique_of_the_National_Security_Courts.pdf; see also Deborah Pearlstein, 
We’re All Experts Now: A Security Case Against Security Detention, 40 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L. L. 577 (2008) (arguing that even if valid under U.S. and international law, preventive 
detention schemes are ineffective in combating terrorism). 
 5. Michael Ratner, Letter to the Editor, A New Court for Terror Suspects?, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 16, 2007, at A12. 
 6. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 7. While mandating that Guantánamo detainees receive access to U.S. federal courts 
empowered to correct errors after “meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the 
Executive’s power to detain,” id. at 2269, the Court made clear that it was “not address[ing] 
the content of the law that governs petitioners’ detention.”  Id. at 2277. 
 8. See id. at 2276.  On July 21, 2008, Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey gave a 
speech calling on Congress to legislate clear rules to govern some of the procedural issues 
left open by Boumediene.  See Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey, Remarks Prepared for 
Delivery at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (July 21, 2008), 
available at http://justice.gov/ag/speeches/2008/ag-speech-0807213.html. 
 9. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Bush and the Justices Behaved Badly, NAT’L J., June 21, 
2008, at 15; Benjamin Wittes, Congress’s Guantanamo Burden, WASH. POST, June 13, 2008, 
at A23.
 
 10. A CRITIQUE OF “NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS,” supra note 4, at 4. 
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procedural reform and by pointing the way toward appropriately tailored 
legislative options.  It argues that the current debate’s focus on procedural 
and institutional questions of how to detain suspected terrorists has been 
allowed to overshadow the questions of why administratively detain, and 
whom to detain.  Not only are the answers to these questions at least as 
important as the procedural rules in safeguarding and balancing liberty and 
security, but their resolution should precede analysis of the procedural 
issues.  The soundness of any specific procedural architecture depends 
heavily on its purpose and on the substantive determinations it is expected 
to make. 
To some, the answers to the why and whom questions may seem 
obvious – to prevent terrorism we should detain terrorists.  With those 
basic ideas apparently settled, the administrative detention debate tends to 
jump quickly to the question of how to detain: What procedural protections 
should we afford suspects?  What rights should they have to challenge 
evidence proffered against them – and with what kind of lawyer assistance? 
What kinds of officials should adjudicate cases?11 
The answers to why and whom are more complex and consequential 
than they may seem at first glance.  There are several different ways in 
which detention can help prevent terrorism, including incapacitating 
terrorists, disrupting specific plots, deterring potential terrorists, and 
gathering information through interrogation.  The choice of which among 
these preventive objectives to emphasize will, in turn, drive the way the 
class of individuals subject to detention is defined, with major implications 
for both liberty and security.  The way we answer the why and whom 
questions will then significantly determine the procedural architectural 
needs of any new administrative detention regime.  This article therefore 
cautions against jumping too quickly in administrative detention 
discussions to the issue of procedural design, or the how questions. 
Part I of this article briefly explores the Bush administration’s approach 
to the why and whom questions, in particular its reliance on a theory of 
“enemy combatants,” and the logic behind calls to reform it through 
administrative detention legislation.  Part II examines various strategic 
objectives behind administrative detention proposals, and Parts III and IV 
then explain how those objectives translate into different definitions of the 
class subject to proposed detention laws.  Part V returns to the procedural 
issues and shows how new administrative detention processes – or perhaps 
even special national security courts – would likely look very different 
depending on the strategic choices underlying them.  Rather than coming 
down for or against new administrative detention law, this article identifies 
 
 11. Cf. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (2008) (detailing how most court decisions in cases challenging Bush 
administration counterterrorism detention policies have not directly addressed substantive 
rights, but instead have focused on procedural rights). 
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the approaches that stand the best chance of successfully protecting security 
and liberty, as well as questions that should guide further consideration and 
refinement of the policies. 
I.  ENEMY COMBATANT DETENTION AND CALLS FOR  
PROCEDURAL REFORM 
The Bush administration’s approach to detention began with the notion 
that the United States is at war with al Qaeda and those aligned with it.12  
Supporting that notion, the 2001 congressional authorization of the use of 
military force authorizes “all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001,”13 and the U.N. Security Council declared the day after 
9/11 that the terrorist attacks constituted “a threat to international peace and 
security.”14  The Bush administration relied in turn on an expansive 
interpretation of its domestic executive war powers and the international 
law of war to assert that those fighting – broadly defined – on behalf of al 
Qaeda and its affiliates, or in some cases those supporting that fight, are 
enemies in an ongoing armed conflict.  As such, any of these constituent 
agents, or “enemy combatants,” may lawfully be captured and detained for 
the duration of hostilities, just as a state would be entitled in the course of a 
war with another state to capture and hold enemy soldiers until the end of 
the war:
 
15   
Because the United States [is] in an armed conflict with al Qaida 
and the Taliban, it [is] proper for the United States and its allies to 
detain individuals who [are] fighting in that conflict.  One of the 
most basic precepts in the law of armed conflict is that states may 
detain enemy combatants until the cessation of hostilities.16 
Of course, to the extent this is a war, it is not the usual kind between 
states.  As former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey remarked: 
 
 12. See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT 
INSIDE THE  BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007); JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S 
ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006). 
 13. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); 
see also Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005). 
 14. S.C. Res. 1368, ¶1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). 
 15. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President et al., 
Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002) (reprinted in KAREN J. 
GREENBERG & JOSHUA L. DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 134-
135 (2005)); Remarks by Attorney General Mukasey, supra note 8.
 
 16. John B. Bellinger, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at the London 
School of Economics: Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism (Oct. 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/2006/98861.htm. 
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We are confronted not with a hostile foreign state whose fighters 
wear uniforms and abide by the laws of war themselves, but rather 
with a dispersed group of non-state terrorists who wear no uniforms 
and abide by neither laws nor the norms of civilization.  And 
although wars traditionally have come to an end that is easy to 
identify, no one can predict when this one will end or even how 
we’ll know it’s over.17 
While the Attorney General intended this statement to justify the 
government’s continuing reliance on its enemy combatant detention 
authority,18 problems with this approach are quickly apparent.  Although 
even in conventional warfare the notion of “enemy combatants” may elude 
either clear definition or easy application, members of terrorist 
organizations generally try to obfuscate their identities and blend 
indistinguishably into civilian populations.19  The organizations themselves 
lack the formalized structures of states, thereby greatly exacerbating the 
probability of misidentifying an innocent civilian as an enemy (a problem 
discussed in greater detail below).  The stakes of such errors are also 
magnified by the likelihood that this conflict with al Qaeda or its spinoff 
organizations will last for decades, thus raising the specter of indefinite 
deprivation of innocents’ liberty.20 
Critiques of the Bush administration’s reliance on this “enemy 
combatancy” theory to justify detentions have focused heavily on the 
inadequacy of the process by which detention decisions are made.21  
 
 17. See Remarks by Attorney General Mukasey, supra note 8. 
 18. See id. (“But those differences do not make it any less important, or any less fair, 
for us to detain those who take up arms against us.”). 
 19. The law of war contains definitions of certain classes of combatants that are 
entitled to particular protections, such as “prisoner-of-war status upon capture,” see, e.g., 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention], but it generally 
defines the broad category of “combatants” only in the negative.  Protocol I of the Geneva 
Conventions says that “[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection [from attack] unless and for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”  Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.  Article 3 of the Third 
Geneva Convention protects “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities.”  Third 
Geneva Convention, supra.  These provisions imply that combatancy derives from “direct” 
or “active” participation on behalf of an enemy in an armed conflict, which is itself a subject 
of great controversy.  See International Committee of the Red Cross, Direct Participation in 
Hostilities (Dec. 31, 2005), http://icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/participation-
hostilities-ihl-311205. 
 20. See Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and 
Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2008). 
 21. See, e.g., DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS 
LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 50-59 (2007); P. Sabin Willett, Op-Ed., Detainees Deserve 
Court Trials, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2005, at A21; Statement of U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy 
On the Detention Center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (June 30, 2005), available at 
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Whether arguing that those detained deserve full-fledged criminal trials or 
that detentions should be judicially reviewed or that the government failed 
even to provide the minimal battlefield hearings required by the Geneva 
Conventions,22 critics have tended to focus their attacks on the how 
questions of detention.  Less often discussed is the whom question – that is, 
the substantive scope of the detention class.23 
The U.S. government has so far avoided demarcating the outer bounds 
of this class in order to maximize its freedom of action in combating major 
terrorist networks.24  In explaining to a U.N. human rights committee its 
legal authority to detain suspected al Qaeda fighters, the government stated 
that its detention authority extended to “members of al-Qaida, the Taliban, 
and their affiliates and supporters, whether captured during acts of 
belligerency themselves or directly supporting hostilities in aid of such 
enemy forces.”25  And at Guantánamo, the government has used the 
following standard to justify detention, though without further defining 
publicly its terms or acknowledging this as the outer boundary of its 
asserted detention authority: 
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida 
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against 
 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200506/063005b.html.  Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 
2229, 2269 (2008) (“Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than, say, after 
being tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most pressing. . . .  
What matters is the sum total of procedural protections afforded to the detainee at all stages, 
direct and collateral.”). 
 22. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IMBALANCE OF POWERS: HOW 
CHANGES TO U.S. LAW & POLICY SINCE 9/11 ERODE HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 47-
69 (2003), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/loss/imbalance/powers.pdf.
 
23. For some critiques of the expansive definition, see, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 
534 F.3d 213, 230 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment) (2008) 
(interpreting prior Supreme Court precedent as supporting the conclusion that “enemy 
combatant status rests on an individual’s affiliation during wartime with the ‘military arm of 
the enemy government.’”); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law, U.S. War 
Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653, 2655-2658 (2005) 
(arguing that mere membership without conduct is not enough to be categorized as an 
“enemy combatant”); Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 U.S. 
2229 (2008) (No. 06-1195), 2007 WL 2441590, at 33-34.  On March 6, 2009, the Supreme 
Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment in Al-Marri and remanded the case with 
instructions that it be dismissed as moot. 2009 U.S. LEXIS 1777.  The Obama 
administration decided to try Al-Marri in federal court rather than to defend the Fourth 
Circuit’s approval of military detention.  See Robert Barnes & Carrie Johnson, Court Puts 
Off Decision on Indefinite Detention; Justices: Indictment Made Issue Moot, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 7, 2009, at A5; Adam Liptak, Justices Erase Court Ruling That Allowed a  Detention, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009, at A9. 
 24. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 21, at 59-63; see also Boumediene v. Bush, No. 
04-1166 (RJL), 2008 WL 4722127 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2008). 
 25. See Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State 
Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Annex 1 at 47, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3 (June 29, 
2005). 
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the United States or its coalition partners.  This includes any person 
who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported 
hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.26 
In one oft-cited litigation colloquy, the government went so far as to argue 
that merely providing a charitable gift could qualify the so-called “little old 
lady in Switzerland” donor as an “enemy combatant” if the recipient turned 
out to be an al Qaeda front.27  Even having backed off this most extreme 
view,28 however, the Bush administration steadfastly avoided detailed 
public discussion of what it means to be a “member,” how it defined “al 
Qaida” or its affiliates and supporters, and what activities constitute 
belligerency or support or aid to any of these groups or activities.29 
The case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld30 highlights the Bush administration’s 
apparently deliberate ambiguity on this critical definitional question.  
Hamdi involved a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan and held at 
Guantánamo who challenged the legality of his detention.  While not stating 
clearly the substantive reach of its “enemy combatant” definition, the 
government argued that the Executive’s “wartime determination that an 
individual is an enemy combatant is a quintessentially military judgment” 
that no court should second-guess.31  That is, the government argued until 
the Hamdi holding that the Executive should have unreviewable discretion 
to decide if an individual falls within the definition of “enemy combatant,” 
and that it should have unreviewable discretion to determine the scope of 
the definition itself.32 
 
 26. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Order Establishing 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul 
2004/d20040707review.pdf. 
 27. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C 2005).
 
 28. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, supra, 534 F.3d at 226 (Motz, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 29. The breadth of the government’s definition came under attack recently by the D.C. 
Circuit, see Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and a minority of the Fourth 
Circuit, see Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, supra 534 F.3d at 231-247 (Motz, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  While this article was in press, the Obama administration submitted a 
memorandum in habeas corpus proceedings that offered a slightly modified definition of the 
class subject to detention at Guantánamo.  See Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the 
Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re 
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. March 13, 2009), at 
2, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf.
 
 30. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 31. Brief for the Respondent at 25, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-
6696).
 
 32. The Hamdi plurality held that an individual captured on the battlefield in 
Afghanistan fell within the implicit detention authority of the 2001 Authorization of the Use 
of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, but it explicitly left “[t]he permissible 
bounds of the category [of enemy combatant to] be defined by the lower courts as 
subsequent cases are presented to them.”  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522 n.1. 
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This maneuver was even more starkly visible in the government’s 
argument in Rasul v. Bush,33 which involved the question of whether the 
federal habeas corpus statute extended federal court jurisdiction to claims 
arising at Guantánamo:  “The ‘enemy’ status of aliens captured and 
detained during war is a quintessential political question on which the 
courts respect the actions of the political branches.”34  The government went 
on to argue that “courts have . . . no judicially-manageable standards . . . to 
evaluate or second-guess the conduct of the President and the military” on 
such matters.35 
In both Hamdi and Rasul the government lost on the procedural issue.  
In Hamdi the Court held that due process requires a citizen detainee be 
given adequate notice of and opportunity to contest the claims against him,36 
and in Rasul it held that statutory habeas rights (i.e., an opportunity to bring 
before a federal judge a challenge to detention) apply to detainees at 
Guantánamo.37  Boumediene then went a step further in holding that 
constitutional habeas rights also apply to Guantánamo detainees.38  But in 
none of these cases did the Court address head on the government’s claim 
that it would be impossible to fashion judicially manageable standards of 
“enemy combatancy,” and in all of these cases the Court essentially invited 
Congress to do so. 
Are courts really limited in their capacity to adjudicate the “enemy” 
status of detainees?  Suppose Congress wants to regulate detention of 
enemy terrorists, including establishing a stronger oversight role by the 
courts, which is what administrative detention proposals seek to do.  Taking 
as a point of departure the Bush administration’s assertion that defining 
whom to detain is an issue of tremendous policy and strategic significance – 
but believing that it is one that Congress and courts ought to have a strong 
hand in regulating – how should an administrative detention regime be 
constituted in substantive terms? 
The vast bulk of discussion of administrative detention immediately 
swings back to procedural architecture, based on the assumption that setting 
the appropriate level of procedural protection can effectively balance 
security and liberty.39  Three particular elements of procedural design are 
most consistently and notably thought to be key to this balance: judicial 
review, adversarial process with lawyer representation, and transparency.40  
 
 33. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 34. Brief for the Respondents at 35, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 
03-343).
 
 35. Id. at 37. 
 36. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004). 
 37. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-481. 
 38. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008). 
 39. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
 40. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 21, at 251-252; AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMMITTEE ON 
LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY ET AL., DUE PROCESS AND TERRORISM: A POST WORKSHOP REPORT 
16 (2007), available at http://www.mccormicktribune.org/publications/dueprocess. pdf.
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And, indeed, each of them – individually and in tandem – has a vital role to 
play in any effective administrative detention system. 
Judicial review can help safeguard liberty and enhance the credibility at 
home and abroad of administrative detention by ensuring neutrality of the 
decision maker and publicly certifying the legality of the detention in 
question.  Most administrative detention proposals start with a strong role 
for courts.  Some believe that a new court is needed, perhaps a National 
Security Court made up of specially designated judges who would build 
expertise in terrorism cases over time.41  Others suggest expanding the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s jurisdiction to handle detention 
cases,42 since it already has judges with expertise in handling sensitive 
intelligence matters and mechanisms to ensure secrecy.  Still others insist 
that specialized terrorism courts are dangerous, and that the legitimacy of a 
detention system can best be ensured by giving regular, generalist judges a 
say in each decision.43 
Adversarial process and access to attorneys can help further protect 
liberty and enhance the perceived legitimacy of detention systems.  As with 
judicial review, though, proposals then tend to split over how best to 
organize and ensure this adversarial contest. Some argue that habeas corpus 
suits are the best check on administrative detention.44  Others argue that 
administrative detention decisions should be contested at an early stage by 
lawyers of the detainee’s choosing.45  Still others recognize an imperative 
need for secrecy and deep expertise in terrorism and intelligence matters, 
which would necessitate a specially designated “defense bar” operated by 
the government on detainees’ behalf.46 
This issue of secrecy runs in tension with a third common element of 
procedural and institutional reform proposals: openness and transparency.  
The Bush administration’s approach had allegedly been prone to error in 
part because of excessive secrecy and hostility to the prying eyes of courts 
or Congress, let alone the press and advocacy groups.  Open or at least 
partially open hearings or written judgments that can later be scrutinized by 
 
 41. See Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3; McCarthy & Velshi, supra note 2; Guiora, 
supra note 2.
 
 42. See PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE N. KAYYEM, PROTECTING LIBERTY IN AN AGE 
OF TERROR 18, 51-52 (2005); see also STEPHANIE COOPER BLUM, THE NECESSARY EVIL OF 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR: A PLAN FOR A MORE MODERATE AND 
SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION (2008) (recommending using the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court to monitor a statutory regime of preventive detention).
 
 43. See A CRITIQUE OF “NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS,” supra note 4. 
 44. See, e.g., Alberto J. Mora & Thomas R. Pickering, Op-Ed., Extend Legal Rights to 
Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2007, at B7; Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, 
Chairman, Judiciary Committee, On Amendment 2022, The Habeas Corpus Restoration Act 
of 2007 (Sept. 19, 2007), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200709/091907.html.
 
 45. See, e.g., Guiora, supra note 2, at 527.
 
 46. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3; Wittes & Gitenstein, supra note 2, at 
10; McCarthy & Velshi, supra note 2, at 36.
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the public or congressional oversight committees, critics and reformists 
argue, would help put pressure on the executive branch to exercise greater 
care in deciding which detention cases to pursue and put pressure on 
adjudicators to act in good faith and with more diligence.47 
These three elements of procedural design reform – judicial review, 
adversarial process, and transparency – may help reduce the likelihood of 
mistakes and restore the credibility of detention decision making.  That all 
three are deeply embedded in American law and international human rights 
law48 makes it unsurprising that they would surface consistently in reform 
discussions.  Rarely, though, do these discussions pause long on the prior 
question of what it is that these courts – however more specifically 
constituted – will evaluate.  Judicial review of what?  A meaningful 
opportunity to contest what with the assistance of lawyers?  Transparent 
determinations of what? 
Deciding the appropriate factual predicate to be proven or disproven – 
that is, to define the class of individuals subject to administrative detention 
and the substantive standards by which detentions will be judged – requires 
stepping back even further to consider carefully the strategic rationale for 
proposed new legal tools. 
II.  WHY DETAIN? 
The reason administrative detention is widely discussed at all is 
because the threat of terrorism is thought by proponents to involve a 
category of individuals for whom neither criminal justice nor the law of war 
– the two legal systems historically used to authorize and regulate most 
long-term detention of dangerous individuals – offers effective and just 
solutions.49  The argument generally begins with the notion that exclusive 
reliance on prosecution, along with its usual panoply of defendants’ rights 
and strict rules of evidence, cannot effectively, expeditiously, or 
exhaustively remove the threat of dangerous terrorists. 50  The reasons for 
 
 47. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3; Wittes & Gitenstein, supra note 2, at 
10. 
 48. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 9, 14, Dec. 19, 1966, 
S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 49. See WITTES, supra note 2; Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3; Matthew Waxman, 
Op-Ed., The Smart Way To Shut Gitmo Down, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2007, at B4. 
 50. France relies on criminal law for detaining suspected terrorists, but its criminal 
laws are so expansive and the arrest and investigation powers of the government so potent 
that its criminal law system often functions much like administrative detention might.  See 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PREEMPTING JUSTICE: COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS AND PROCEDURES 
IN FRANCE (2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/07/01/preempting-justice.  Pre-trial 
detention, for example, can last up to four years.  According to France’s legendary 
counterterrorism judge, Jean-Louis Bruguiere: 
Every government has an obligation to react to the threat.  But the common law 
system is too rigid, it can’t adapt because its procedural laws are more important 
than the criminal laws at the base, and the procedure depends on custom so it 
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this include: information used to identify terrorists and their plots includes 
extremely sensitive intelligence sources and methods, the disclosure of 
which during trial would undermine or even negate counterterrorism 
operations; the conditions under which some suspected terrorists are 
captured, especially in faraway combat zones or ungoverned regions, make 
it impossible to prove criminal cases using normal evidentiary rules;51 
prosecution is designed to punish past conduct, but fighting terrorism 
requires stopping suspects before they act; and criminal justice is 
deliberately tilted in favor of defendants so that few if any innocents will be 
punished, but the higher stakes of terrorism cannot allow the same 
likelihood that some guilty persons will go free.52 
On the other hand, the argument continues, the law of war – under 
which individual enemy fighters can be captured and held for the duration 
of hostilities without trial – does not deal satisfactorily with modern-day 
terrorism threats either.53  Law of war rules grew out of conflicts primarily 
between professional armies (acting as agents responsible to states) that 
could be expected to last months or maybe years but would likely end 
definitively.  Terrorism, by contrast, involves an enemy whose fighters 
cannot be identified with similar precision and is unlikely to end soon or at 
all or with any certainty.  Applying the traditional law of war detention 
rules therefore opens the possibility of indefinite detention without trial 
combined with substantial likelihood of error.54 
To its proponents, administrative detention offers a way out of the stark 
 
doesn’t change easily.  The civil law system is more flexible because it functions 
according to laws voted by parliament and can react faster. 
Id. at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62151/section/4 (quoting Jean-Louis Bruguiere).  See also 
ANTOINE GARAPON, REAL INSTITUTO ELCANO, IS THERE A FRENCH ADVANTAGE IN THE FIGHT 
AGAINST TERRORISM? (2005), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/807/Garapon807. 
pdf. 
 51. As the Wall Street Journal editorial page put it, “[T]he truth is that in the fog of 
battle it is impossible to gather evidence the way a Manhattan cop can. There’s no ‘CSI: 
Kandahar.’”  Editorial, The Enemy Detainee Mess, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2008, at A10. 
 52. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME 
OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 64-65 (2006) (on risk calculus); Andrew McBride, Op-Ed., We’ll 
Rue Having Judges on the Battlefield, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2008, at A7 (on battlefield 
constraints); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Establishing a Constitutional Process: Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Daniel Dell’Orto, Principal 
Deputy General Counsel, Department of Defense), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1986&wit_id=5506; Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed., Jose Padilla 
Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, at A15 (on disclosure of sensitive intelligence 
information during trial); David Cole, Closing Guantanamo, BOSTON REV., Jan./Feb. 2009, 
available at http://bostonreview.net/BR34.1/ cole.php (on problems related to secrecy and 
burden of proof).  For counter-arguments, emphasizing that criminal law is sufficient to deal 
with terrorism threats, see Roth, supra note 4; Thomas B. Wilner, Op-Ed., We Don’t Need 
Guantanamo Bay, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2008.
 
 53. See WITTES, supra note 2; Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3. 
 54. See Waxman, supra note 20.
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choice between these two systems.55  Most likely any sensible alternative 
scheme will include some elements that resemble criminal justice and 
others that resemble the law of war, for the simple reason that terrorism 
shares some features of crime and some of war.56  But this leads to the 
difficult questions of where one system should start and another end and 
how we should sort out who goes into which.57  So we need to think through 
how to define the set of cases that fall between the two existing systems and 
that may demand an alternative.  This requires a clear notion of the needs: 
what is it about terrorism that might necessitate a step so precipitous as 
creating a new kind of detention legal system? 
There is surprisingly little discussion in the policy or academic realms 
of precisely how detention fits within a broader U.S. and allied strategy to 
combat terrorism, or perhaps more specifically al Qaeda.  At least within 
the public domain there appears to be no comprehensive effort by the U.S. 
government to review lessons learned to date about the strategic 
appropriateness of whom it has detained.58  The 9/11 Commission Report 
contained only one significant recommendation with respect to detention 
and that had to do with treatment standards, not with the legal powers to 
detain.59  The White House’s publicly released 2006 National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism mentioned several times the need to capture enemy 
terrorists but mentioned not a single time the role or utility of the broad 
detention authorities asserted since September 11, 2001 – a surprising 
omission given the tremendous resources that have been devoted to 
detention operations at Guantánamo and elsewhere and the immense 
opposition to those operations from the courts, Congress, the public, and 
U.S. allies, among others.60 
That said, it is virtually undisputed among those who advocate 
administrative detention that its purpose is preventive: a prophylactic 
measure against terrorist threats.61  Of course, criminal justice also has a 
 
 55. See Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: 
Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 369 (2008). 
 56. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES 
IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006). 
 57. See Burt Neuborne, Spheres of Justice: Who Decides?, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1090 (2006). 
 58. The British Government, by contrast, has discussed with much greater precision 
how its various detention authorities fit together, and whom it has targeted with them and 
why. CABINET OFFICE, COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S 
STRATEGY, 2006, Cm. 6888, at 17-20, available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/ 
contest-report. 
 59. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 379-380 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/ 
911Report.pdf.
 
 60. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 
(2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf.
 
 61. Indeed, the term “preventive detention” is often used interchangeably with 
“administrative detention.”  See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, The Candidates’ Four Detention 
2009] WHY DETAIN, AND DETAIN WHOM?  13 
 
preventive component.  But criminal law is generally retrospective in focus, 
in that it addresses past acts.62  The resulting punishment, including 
incarceration, serves preventive purposes insofar as it keeps a perpetrator 
off the street (for some period of time) and deters both him and others from 
future crime. 
Whereas at base criminal justice addresses past harms committed by 
individuals,63 administrative detention proposals tend to be prospective in 
focus.  They start with the conviction that terrorist acts – especially major 
attacks – must be addressed before they occur.  The consequences of failure 
to prevent terrorist attacks are too high, the argument goes, to rely on 
retrospective responses alone.  When it comes to crime, we do not typically 
use the mere likelihood that someone will act – even high likelihood of 
violent crime – to justify detention.  As Judge Posner explains: 
Requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases causes 
many guilty defendants to be acquitted and many other guilty 
persons not to be charged in the first place.  We accept this as a 
price worth paying to protect the innocent.  But ordinary crime does 
not imperil national security; modern terrorism does, so the 
government’s burden of proof should be lighter, though how much 
lighter is a matter of judgment.64 
We tolerate high levels of recidivism in parole programs, reasoning that it is 
more costly to keep all convicts locked up than to accept a certain level of 
crime.  But terrorism, according to administrative detention proponents, is 
different.  The ability of small groups to harness modern technology 
(including, especially in the future, weapons of mass destruction) to cause 
mass casualties, damage, panic, and threats to effective governance puts 
terrorism on a different plane.65 
 
Camps, NAT’L J., Aug. 4, 2007 (using the terms interchangeably); see also Emanuel Gross, 
Human Rights, Terrorism and the Problem of Administrative Detention in Israel: Does a 
Democracy Have the Right To Hold Terrorists as Bargaining Chips?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. LAW 721, 752 (2001) (“Administrative detention, sometimes known as preventive 
detention, refers to a situation where a person is held without trial.”) 
 62. There are, of course, some exceptions, such as inchoate crimes or conspiracy 
liability. 
 63. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 21, at 47-50. 
 64. POSNER, supra note 52, at 64-65. 
 65. See id.; ACKERMAN, supra note 56, at 39-57; Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch & 
Philip D. Zelikow, Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 80 
(1998); see also Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, and the D.C. Circuit, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 693, 702 (2005) (noting that in the terrorism context, “judicial errors may 
turn out to be disastrous rather than merely harmful”).  To be sure, concern about the danger 
of major terrorist attack can be taken too far, as in what has been dubbed the “One Percent 
Doctrine” for dealing with “a low-probability, high-impact threat.” Former Vice President 
Dick Cheney stated:  “If there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al 
Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our 
14 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY  [Vol. 3:1 
This notion of prevention, however, needs to be further unpacked.  
There are at least four major ways in which detention contributes to 
terrorism prevention: 
$  incapacitation 
$  deterrence 
$  disruption 
$  information-gathering 
Each of these sub-elements of prevention has implications for how 
administrative detention laws should be crafted and how institutions for 
adjudicating cases should be designed. 
The most natural inclination of a government facing threats of terrorism 
is to incapacitate suspected terrorists: If someone has the will and 
capability to commit terrorism, keep him off the streets.  The purpose of 
such detention is not punitive or retributive (though such desires might lurk 
in the background); it is protective and preemptive, to put potential threats 
out of action. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld described the Guantánamo 
detainees in 2002, for example, as “among the most dangerous, best-
trained, vicious killers on the face of the earth,”66 justifying the camp as 
necessary to stop them from carrying out their violent objectives.  This 
preventive purpose underlies the law of war’s detention rules, in that those 
rules aim to block captured soldiers from returning to an ongoing fight.67  
As former Attorney General Mukasey explained: 
The United States has every right to capture and detain enemy 
combatants in this conflict, and we need not simply release them to 
return to the battlefield. . . .  We have every right to prevent them 
from returning to kill our troops or those fighting with us, and to 
target innocent civilians.68 
Beyond incapacitating existing threats, a government might wield the 
threat of detention to deter future terrorist recruits from joining the cause or 
participating in terrorist activities.  In other words, the possibility of getting 
caught and held by the government may dissuade terrorists or future 
terrorists from joining terrorist groups or perpetrating terrorist acts. 69  The 
 
response.”  RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICCA’S PURSUIT 
OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 61, 62 (2006).
 
 66. Press Briefing, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (Jan. 27, 2002), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=232.
 
 67. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
 68. Remarks by Attorney General Mukasey, supra note 8. 
 69. Discussion of deterrence is usually divided into two concepts, both of which are 
relevant here: specific deterrence, which discourages an individual from certain conduct by 
instilling an understanding of negative consequences, and general deterrence, which makes 
an example of an individual’s punishment to discourage the broader population from deviant 
conduct.  See generally Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of 
2009] WHY DETAIN, AND DETAIN WHOM?  15 
 
more credible the threat of capture and detention, and the more severe the 
consequences (say, the longer the threatened period of detention, or the 
more severe its conditions), so the theory goes, the greater the deterrent 
pressure. 
These notions of incapacitating or deterring terrorists or future terrorists 
may potentially point at large groups of individuals and their dangerous 
activities: If we can discern who has the intent and capability – or potential 
to develop that intent and capability – to commit or support terrorist acts, 
we will try to block or dissuade them.  But a narrower way to formulate a 
preventive purpose of administrative detention is to disrupt terrorist plots: 
A group of individuals is preparing to carry out a terrorist attack or 
campaign of attacks, so use the detention of certain persons to foil that 
plot.70  Whereas incapacitation focuses heavily on the characteristics of 
categories of individuals, disruption focuses on their joint or individual 
activities.  It is not so much about neutralizing very dangerous people as 
neutralizing their impending schemes. 
Each of these preventive strategies contains some key assumptions 
about the government’s knowledge of the terrorist threat.  An incapacitation 
strategy assumes the state’s ability to assess accurately who is likely to pose 
a future danger and to therefore devote resources to stemming their future 
dangerous activities.  A prevention strategy emphasizing deterrence 
assumes the state’s ability to manipulate sufficiently the fears of future 
terrorists at large.  And a disruption strategy assumes the state’s ability to 
identify plots in advance and their key individual enablers.71 
A fourth preventive reason to detain is therefore to gather information.  
Thwarting terrorist plots requires getting inside the heads of network 
members, to understand their intentions, capabilities, and modes of 
operation.  Detention can facilitate such intelligence collection through, 
most obviously, interrogation, but also through monitoring conversations 
among prisoners or even “turning” terrorist agents and sending them back 
out as government informants.  Governments usually justify publicly 
counterterrorism detentions on incapacitation or disruption grounds, but no 
doubt information-gathering was at the forefront of the Bush 
administration’s detention policies,72 as demonstrated by the lengths to 
 
Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 
1316 (2000); Mark C. Stafford & Mark Warr, A Reconceptualization of General and 
Specific Deterrence, 30 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 123–135 (1993).
 
 70. See RICHARD A. POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM: BLURRED FOCUS, HALTING 
STEPS 205 (2007). 
 71. See CABINET OFFICE, supra note 58, at 16 (“All disruption operations depend upon 
the collection and exploitation of information and intelligence that helps identify terrorist 
networks, including their membership, intentions, and means of operation.”). 
 72. The declaration by Defense Intelligence Agency Director Vice Admiral Lowell E. 
Jacoby in the litigation involving alleged dirty-bomber Jose Padilla is especially 
illuminating: “The United States is now engaged in a robust program of interrogating . . . 
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which that Administration went to defend permissive interrogation 
standards and CIA detention programs.73  “These are dangerous men with 
unparalleled knowledge about terrorist networks and their plans for new 
attacks,” explained President Bush in September 2006, in disclosing 
publicly the CIA secret detention program.  “The security of our nation and 
the lives of our citizens depend on our ability to learn what these terrorists 
know.”74 
This last point about facilitating information-gathering shows that there 
are often synergies among the preventive approaches.  Incapacitating 
individuals suspected of posing serious dangers may deter individuals from 
engaging in or supporting dangerous activities.  Disrupting major plots and 
interrogating the plotters may reveal a lot about how future schemes will be 
hatched and who among the many dangerous individuals remaining at large 
are most likely to play critical roles in those schemes.  Any sound 
counterterrorism strategy will combine all of these elements to some 
degree.75 
But there are also tradeoffs among these elements of prevention.  In 
part this is due to the costs of detention, some of which are discussed 
below.76  It also results from the fact that counterterrorism detention strategy 
– and with it consideration of administrative detention’s utility in certain 
circumstances – is formulated in an environment of constrained resources. 
There are also, however, tensions among the preventive purposes of 
detention and the means to achieve them.  For example, the government can 
monitor suspects’ movements and communications, not only to foresee and 
forestall plots but to gain a more complete picture of the terrorist network 
and its activities; but the moment the government detains someone, those 
movements and communications may cease along with its ability to track 
them.  Releasing a captured individual still believed to pose a danger may 
offer opportunities to follow him, perhaps with more to be gained through 
information collection than the marginal risk of his committing major 
violence.  In other words, an aggressive incapacitation approach may 
 
enemy combatants in the War on Terrorism.  [They] hold critical information about our 
enemy and its planned attacks against the United States that is vital to our national security.”  
Declaration of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby (USN) Director of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency at 6, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02CV04445), 
2002 WL 34342502. 
 73. See Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement of 
Severe Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007; at A1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Says 
Interrogation Methods Aren’t Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2007, at A1.
 
 74. President George W. Bush, Speech: President Discusses Creation of Military 
Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html.  See also Remarks by Attorney General Mukasey, 
supra note 8. (“Detention often yields valuable intelligence about the intentions, 
organization, operations, and tactics of our enemy.”).
 
 75. See PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (2008); CABINET OFFICE, supra note 58. 
 76. See infra Part IV. 
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sometimes undermine information-gathering activities.77  As the U.K. 
government’s Intelligence and Security Committee reported in its 
examination of the 2005 London subway bombings, “[t]here is always a 
difficult balance to strike between investigating those known to be a current 
threat and working to discover other possible threats.”78 
In considering new detention laws, the critical question is therefore not 
simply the utility of proposed legal authorities.  It is their benefits and costs 
compared to alternative available tools and in combination.  That 
assessment requires knowing more precisely whom the new laws would 
detain, the subject of Part IV. 
III.  DETAIN WHOM? 
Aside from clarifying the policy requirements motivating 
administrative detention proposals – and therefore allowing better 
comparison to existing legal tools – answering the why question helps guide 
the substantive definition of the class subject to that detention.  That is, the 
answer to why administratively detain heavily determines whom specifically 
to detain.  Should Congress draw administrative detention laws targeting 
those who pose a certain level and type of dangerousness?  Or who 
committed certain acts?  Or who are members of certain designated terrorist 
groups?  Or who has information about others who are?  This Part explores 
how Congress might define the subject class, drawing on examples from 
American law and anti-terrorism laws in other democracies. 
One approach to new detention laws would simply continue using the 
Bush administration’s notion of enemy combatancy as the relevant inquiry.  
That is, recalling the definitions cited earlier, courts might be charged with 
determining whether an individual is a “member” of a certain organization, 
or has committed a “belligerent act,” or has “supported” those who are or 
have.79  The government’s claim in Hamdi and Rasul notwithstanding, one 
can certainly construct judicially manageable standards for any of these 
inquiries.80  After all, these concepts have analogues in criminal law that 
judges apply regularly (say, conspiracy liability in the case of membership 
 
 77. The case of the “Lackawanna 6” provides an illustration of how this tension 
among priorities has played out in practice.  Upon discovering a possible al Qaeda sleeper 
cell outside Buffalo, New York, in 2002, some elements within the United States 
Government favored immediate arrest while others favored surveillance.  See Robert M. 
Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 
42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 40-44 (2005).
 
 78. Quoted in CABINET OFFICE, supra note 58, at 17. 
 79. See supra Part I. 
 80. Indeed, this is what federal courts are now charged with doing with respect to 
many Guantánamo detainees following Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), sitting 
as habeas courts reviewing the factual basis for detention.  See Boumediene v. Bush, No. 04-
1166 (RJL), 2008 WL 4722127 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2008). 
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or aiding and abetting in the case of support).81 
Once free from the paradigmatic confines of the law of war, however, in 
designing an administrative detention regime, enemy combatancy need not be 
the starting point at all.  After all, the traditional notion of enemy combatancy 
grew out of a warfare context in which participation in an enemy army could 
reasonably be assumed to serve as an accurate indicator of one’s future threat, 
measured in traditional military terms.  Even those who cling to a “war on 
terror” paradigm acknowledge that the fight against terrorism generally or al 
Qaeda in particular is unlike any previous war in terms of the nature of the 
enemy, its threat, and the way we think about success.82  Moreover, it is widely 
believed that since 2001 the terrorist threats to the United States and its allies 
have become less centralized, less hierarchical, and less formalized, even 
further complicating direct application of legal standards developed for fighting 
traditional armies.83  There is a range of alternative ways to define the detention 
class that may better fit the policy problem to be solved. 
One model for defining the class might draw upon existing examples of 
administrative detention in U.S. law, which permit the long-term detention of 
certain categories of individuals judicially adjudged as “dangerous.”  Some 
state laws, for example, authorize the detention of charged or convicted sex 
offenders who, due to a “mental abnormality,” are likely to engage in certain 
acts of sexual violence.84  These statutory schemes might be a particularly apt 
analogue because, as is often supposed about religiously extremist terrorists, 
they were premised legislatively on a view that some sexual predators are 
undeterrable from future violence.85  Under federal bail law, arrestees can 
similarly be held pending trial upon sufficient showing that no release 
conditions would reasonably assure community safety.86 
To be sure, it remains highly debatable whether dangerousness alone as 
an administrative detention standard would pass constitutional muster, at 
least with respect to U.S. citizens or those captured inside the United 
 
 81. See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of 
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008).
 
 82. See BOBBITT, supra note 75. 
 83. Although there exists a major debate among terrorism experts as to the continuing 
strength of al Qaeda, even those who assess al Qaeda as resurgent acknowledge that 
“informal local terrorist groups are certainly a critical part of the global terrorist network.”  
Bruce Hoffmann, The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters, 
FOREIGN AFF, May/June 2008; see also MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR 
NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2008) (arguing that the major terrorist threat to 
the United States and the West now comes from loose-knit local cells).
 
 84. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 85. See id. at 351, 362-363.  Another example is involuntary commitment of certain 
mentally ill persons believed to be dangerous.  In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), 
the Supreme Court held that to comport with Fourteenth Amendment due process in a civil 
proceeding brought under state law to involuntarily commit in a mental hospital an 
individual for an indefinite period only the clear and convincing evidence standard was 
required. 
 86. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
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States.87  In Zadvydas v. Davis, for instance, the Court made clear that 
indefinite administrative detention of a removable alien would raise 
constitutional due process concerns,88 but the Court also noted that a 
statutory scheme directed at suspected terrorists, in particular, might change 
its analysis.89  As in other areas of American law, an administrative 
detention regime might include future dangerousness as at least one critical 
element.  And, accordingly, the central inquiry for courts – assuming 
judicial review – might be to review the Executive’s dangerousness 
assessment. 
Instead of defining the detention category around dangerousness, a 
statute might tie detention to membership or affiliation.  Consider the Alien 
Enemies Act, a statute enacted in 1798 and later amended, which declares: 
Whenever there is a declared war between the United States and 
any foreign nation or government . . . and the President makes 
public proclamation of the event, all natives, citizens, denizens, or 
subjects of the hostile nation or government, being of the age of 
fourteen years and upward, who shall be within the United States 
and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, 
restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies.90 
In Ludecke v. Watkins,91 the Supreme Court upheld the Act’s World 
War II implementation, which occurred via a presidential directive calling 
for detention and removal of all alien enemies “who shall be deemed by the 
Attorney General to be dangerous to the public pea[c]e and safety of the 
United States.”92  The statute, which remains on the books today, was 
clearly premised on the idea that during wartime an individual’s citizenship 
of an enemy state is a strong indicator of threat. 
The United Kingdom’s 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act, as another 
model, allows for the imposition of “control orders” (or restrictions on an 
individual’s movements, communications, or other freedoms) based on past 
or present activities.  It authorizes control orders when the government “has 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been 
involved in terrorism-related activity,” which is further defined as: 
 
 87. The complex constitutional issues are beyond the scope of this paper, but of course 
they are highly relevant and any administrative detention scheme would face intense judicial 
challenge.  Throughout this paper I cite a number of U.S. federal and state preventive 
detention laws that have been upheld, though usually on very narrow grounds. For a view 
skeptical of the constitutionality of preventive detention laws related to terrorism, see Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-557 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
 
 88. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 89. See id. at 691. 
 90. 50 U.S.C. §21 (2006) (originally enacted as Alien Enemies Act of 1798, ch. 66, 1 
Stat. 577). 
 91. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948). 
 92. See id. at 163. 
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(a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism; 
(b) conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or 
instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so; (c) conduct 
which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or 
instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so; (d) conduct 
which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or 
believed to be involved in terrorism-related activity.93 
Under this model, the critical review inquiry for courts focuses not on an 
individualized assessment of future dangerousness or membership but on 
whether an individual committed certain acts.  Parliament likely selected 
these types of acts because they were believed to serve as a good indicator 
of future dangerousness.94 
As yet another set of models, consider two Israeli administrative 
detention schemes, one tied to a showing of necessity and another to 
showing dangerousness-plus.  Under one statutory scheme, its domestic 
“Emergency Powers Law,” the Executive can order judicially reviewed 
detention based on the extremely broad standard of “reasonable cause to 
believe that reasons of state security or public security require that a 
particular person be detained.”95  This does not presuppose a state of war, 
and it contrasts with Israel’s Unlawful Enemy Combatant statute, a law 
passed in 2002 following the Israeli Supreme Court’s concerns over the 
detention of Hezbollah fighters’ family members as bargaining chips.  The 
new statute, recently upheld by the Israeli Supreme Court,96 provides 
authority to detain certain individuals fighting on behalf of foreign forces 
with which Israel regards itself in a state of armed conflict.  Pursuant to 
strict judicial review requirements, the statute authorizes detention of 
someone who “participated either directly or indirectly in hostile acts 
against the State of Israel or is a member of a force perpetrating hostile acts 
against the State of Israel” and whose “release will harm State security.”97  
In other words, detention under the latter scheme requires a showing of 
either certain acts or membership plus dangerousness. 
The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act contains provisions authorizing the 
short-term detention of aliens on grounds similar to many of these previous 
 
 93. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, ch. 2, §§1-2 (Eng.), available at http://www. 
opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/ukpga_20050002_en_1.
 
 94. See CABINET OFFICE, supra note 58, at 17-18. 
 95. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law (EPDL), 5739-1979, S.H. 76, 33 L.S.I. 89-92 
(Isr. 1979).  See generally Administrative Detention: The Legal Basis for Administrative 
Detention, Israeli Law, http://www.btselem.org/English/Administrative_Detention/Israeli_ 
Law.asp . 
 96. See CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. State of Israel [2008] (S. Ct. Isr.), available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04.pdf. 
 97. Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002 (Isr.), available at 32 
ISRAELI Y.B. HUM. RTS. 389 (2002) and at http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/7E86D0 
98-0463-4F37-A38D-8AEBE770BDE6/0/IncarcerationLawedited140302.doc. 
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examples.  It gives the Attorney General power to detain, among others, 
any alien whom he has reason to believe is “likely to engage after entry in 
any terrorist activity,” has “incited terrorist activity,” is a “representative” 
or “member” of a terrorist organization, or “has received military-type 
training” from a terrorist organization.98  The Act also authorizes the 
Attorney General to detain aliens who are “engaged in any other activity 
that endangers the national security of the United States.”99 
These examples are intended to show just a partial range of possible 
definitions of the detention class, any of which is susceptible to judicial 
application.  So which one makes sense: A broad “state security” class?  
Dangerousness?  Membership?  Commission of proscribed acts?  
Knowledge?  The answer depends heavily on strategic purpose. 
If, for example, the overwhelming focus of administrative detention is 
to incapacitate individuals likely to pursue threatening terrorist activities 
(and perhaps to deter others), then the authority to detain would most 
naturally turn on an individual’s supposed dangerousness.  In that regard, a 
statutory scheme might resemble administrative detention laws mentioned 
above, aimed at supposedly very dangerous sex offenders whose prison 
term has expired or pre-trial arrestees.  Or the scheme might rely on proxy 
indicators of dangerousness, as the Israeli Unlawful Enemy Combatant 
statute does, to further restrict and refine the dangerousness inquiry.100  The 
Israeli Supreme Court, in upholding the statute, explained its incapacitation 
purpose in the following terms: 
[W]e are dealing with an administrative detention whose purpose is 
to protect state security by removing from the cycle of hostilities 
anyone who is a member of a terrorist organization or who is taking 
part in the organization’s operations against the State of Israel, in 
view of the threat that he represents to the security of the state and 
the lives of its inhabitants.101 
The incapacitation purpose of the U.K.’s 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act 
control order provisions is likewise clear from its text, which states that “for 
the purposes [of the U.K. statute] it is immaterial whether the acts of 




 98. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, §412(a), Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272, 350-352 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1226a (2006)); 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(A)-
(B) (2006). 
 99. 8 U.S.C. §1226a(a)(3)(B). 
 100. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 101. State of Israel, at ¶15. 
 102. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, ch. 2, §1(9) (Eng.). 
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If, by contrast, the emphasis of administrative detention is not to 
incapacitate individuals but to disrupt impending plots, then the focus of 
authority to detain might be cast differently – in some ways more narrowly 
but in some ways perhaps more broadly.  A 2007 Senate bill, known as the 
National Security with Justice Act, for instance, sought to authorize 
detention on a showing that “failure to detain that [international terrorist] 
will result in a risk of imminent death or imminent serious bodily injury to 
any individual or imminent damage to or destruction of any United States 
facility.”103  On the one hand, in theory disruption can be achieved by 
nabbing only key leaders and planners and those directly involved in a 
specific plot; even if some very dangerous but peripherally involved 
associates remain free, the scheme may be ruined.  On the other hand, 
detention to disrupt might be thought to justify detaining for some period of 
time even individuals who are not dangerous at all (perhaps not very 
committed to the terrorist cause nor capable of doing much harm) but who 
play a role in a particular plot or might just have information about it.104 
The key inquiry in the last example is different from an inquiry about 
incapacitation: detention to disrupt assumes a functional linkage between an 
individual and a plot (or set of plots), whereas incapacitation looks to an 
individual’s general will and capacity to do harm.  A statutory regime 
focused on disruption would accordingly define the class around plots or a 
showing that “but for” detention of a particular individual, terrorist attacks 
are likely.  There will often be some overlap of these categories, but not 
always.  Consider, for example, a terrorist financier who funds several 
terrorist organizations.  The government may regard him as extremely 
dangerous and might believe that detaining him would reduce generally the 
likelihood and effectiveness of future terrorist attacks (incapacitation) and 
would frighten others from funding terrorism (deterrence).  But he is 
unlikely to be covered by a law requiring a showing that failure to detain 
him would substantially increase the risk of a specific, imminent attack.  
Consider then, as an example running the other direction,  a terrorist 
organization’s courier believed to be carrying messages to its members 
about an impending attack: measured against a standard of dangerousness, 
he might fall outside an incapacitation-detention law.  But his specific 
involvement in an imminent attack might put him squarely within a law 
aimed at disruption. 
If the major focus of administrative detention is information-gathering, 
the logical definition of the detention class would change again.  
Administrative detention might target individuals believed to have critical 
information about either terrorism threats generally or, more narrowly, 
specific terrorism plots.  In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. 
 
 103. National Security with Justice Act, S.1876, 110th Cong. §105(a)(1) (2007). 
 104. See infra notes 142-143 and accompanying text.  As explained further below, 
disruption detention along these lines also points toward a short duration of detention, 
whereas dangerousness detention may in some cases point toward long-term detention. 
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government relied – amid much controversy and criticism – on the federal 
material witness statute, which under certain imperative circumstances 
allows arrest of an individual with information critical to a criminal 
proceeding.105  An administrative detention system might similarly define 
detention authority in relation to an individual’s supposed knowledge.106  
Again, often this category of individuals will overlap with inquiries of 
dangerousness or involvement in specific plots, and a law might require a 
showing of membership in a terrorist organization or commission of a 
terrorist act as a threshold matter before even considering the information 
question.  But these categories will not always overlap. Consider, for 
example, an al Qaeda paymaster who might not be individually very 
dangerous but who might have substantial information about associates 
who are.  Taken to the extreme, a law authorizing detention based on 
suspected knowledge alone might be used to justify holding the spouse or 
roommate of a suspected terrorist – even if not complicit – in order to 
question that individual about the suspect’s actions, communications, and 
intentions. 
In sum, the strategic priorities behind administrative detention 
proposals will guide how the substantive class should be defined.  But, one 
might ask, if we need new tools to combat terrorism effectively, why not 
simply define the class broadly – as the Bush administration did  – to give 
the Executive maximum flexibility?  The Executive could then expand and 
contract the administrative detention class as needed to balance security and 
liberty.  Part IV explains why not. 
IV.  RESTRICTING WHY AND WHOM 
As noted earlier,107 the Bush administration argued that broad detention 
authorities are needed for the entire range of reasons listed above – 
including incapacitation, deterrence, disruption, and information-gathering 
– and it therefore fought for an expansive definition of the “enemy 
 
 105. See 18 U.S.C. §3144 (2000).  For critical accounts of its use after 9/11, see HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS TO ABUSE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER THE MATERIAL 
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Michael B. Mukasey: 
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government tried to investigate numerous leads and people to determine whether 
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in Britain and France, among other countries.  And so, the U.S. government 
subpoenaed and arrested on a material witness warrant those like Padilla who 
seemed likely to have information. 
Mukasey, supra note 52. 
 107. See supra Parts I-II. 
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combatants” detention class.108  Even if one rejects the full breadth of the 
Bush administration’s argument, the notion is certainly correct that all the 
elements of prevention listed above feature in any overall counterterrorism 
strategy.109 
The main reason for narrowing the class – for restricting the definition 
of those liable to be administratively detained – is that every expansion 
comes at a price.  This brings us back to the need to consider carefully 
strategic priorities. 
The policy calculus must include consideration not just of the general 
dangers attached to enacting any new detention regime but the marginal 
dangers that come from expanding the size and shape of the susceptible 
class.  A full discussion of all of those dangers is beyond the scope of this 
article, but it is worth highlighting several of the most significant ones 
because they are relevant to the article’s broader point: that the ultimate 
policy merits of administrative detention will turn at least as much on the 
issue of defining the substantive class as on fashioning the right procedures. 
Debates about administrative detention are usually cast in terms of 
liberty versus security.110  But administrative detention – both its use as well 
as its mere enactment – carries risks to both liberty and security.  
Experiences of the U.S. and allied governments since September 2001 
suggest that those costs are unlikely to be mitigated even by robust 
procedural protections without also constraining tightly the substantive 
detention criteria, and those experiences offer valuable lessons that should 
guide the definition of any administrative class. 
Administrative detention opponents justifiably argue that creating new 
mechanisms for detention with diluted procedural protections (compared to 
the procedural features of American criminal justice) puts liberty at risk.111  
The most obvious liberty concern is that innocent individuals will get swept 
up and imprisoned – the “false positive” problem.  Civil libertarians rightly 
worry, too, that aside from the specific risk to particular individuals, any 
expansion of administrative detention (I say “expansion” because, as noted 
earlier, administrative detention already exists in some nonterrorist contexts 
in American law)112 risks more generally eroding checks on state power. To 
some the idea of administrative detention for suspected terrorists is the kind 
of “loaded weapon” that Justice Jackson worried about at the time of 
 
 108. In the course of the Padilla litigation, for example, the Government asserted each 
of them.  Brief of Petitioner at 28-38, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-
1027), 2004 WL 542777.
 
 109. See, e.g., CABINET OFFICE, supra note 58 (explaining the U.K. government’s use of 
each of them). 
 110. See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: 
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007).  
 111. See Roth, supra note 4; Ratner, supra note 5, Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 4; A 
CRITIQUE OF “NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS,” supra note 4. 
 112. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
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Korematsu.113  Furthermore, even if we are satisfied that the U.S. 
government can use administrative detention responsibly, there are many 
unsavory foreign governments that might exploit the precedent for 
repressive purposes.  We need, therefore, to be cautious about justifying 
principles that could be used pretextually by less democratic regimes to 
crack down, for example, on dissidents they might label “terrorists” or 
“national security threats.”114 
In safeguarding liberty against such risks, the discussion usually shifts 
quickly to the procedural protections afforded suspects (such as assistance 
of counsel and strict rules of evidence) or the burdens of proof placed on 
the government (such as probable cause, or beyond a reasonable doubt).  
But the substantive definition of the detention class is key to managing 
these risks as well, and without narrowing the class, even robust procedural 
protections will fail. 
Some relatively narrow definitions – for instance, for those who 
commit certain acts – might generally be provable to great certainty, 
whereas some very broad ones – say, for those who harbor devotion to a 
hostile ideology – may be impossible to prove to a high certainty.  A very 
broad definition of “conduct” or “dangerousness” justifying detention will 
also likely result in rounding up many suspects who would not actually 
have engaged in terrorist conduct.  Indeed, that a broad substantive 
definition of the detention class can overwhelm even the most robust 
procedural protections is reflected in criticisms of recently expanded 
criminal liability for providing “material support” to terrorist organizations 
or engaging in terrorist conspiracies.  Federal criminal statutes have been 
used to prosecute individuals for membership in terrorist organizations or 
for participating in terrorist conspiracies even when no specific terrorist plot 
could be shown.115  Civil libertarians charge that these prosecutions have 
netted many individuals who were actually unlikely to engage in serious 
acts of terrorism.116 
As to the issue of how administrative detention will be perceived and 
used internationally, a narrow set of definitional criteria – requiring, for 
example, a showing of certain specific acts or a linkage to specific plots – 
stands a better chance of winning legitimacy among allies and averting 
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overly expansive interpretations among other countries.117  Although 
creating any new category of administrative detention risks chipping away 
at international norms that generally demand criminal prosecution to lock 
away bad actors, the more narrowly such a carve-out is defined the less 
prone it will be to political manipulation or to further stretching to deal with 
other types of public policy problems. 
Besides these liberty risks, administrative detention carries costs and 
risks from a security standpoint.  Again, the substantive criteria of detention 
law may help mitigate these risks. 
Historically, detention practices – especially those viewed as overbroad 
– have sometimes proven counterproductive in combating terrorism and 
radicalization, and consideration of administrative detention’s strategic 
utility should weigh these dangers.  The British government learned 
painfully that internment of suspected Northern Ireland terrorists was 
viewed among Northern Irish communities as a form of collective 
punishment that fueled violent nationalism, and detention helped dry up 
community informants.118  And in Iraq and Afghanistan, though exceptional 
cases because combat still rages there, detention has played an important 
role in neutralizing threats to coalition forces but has also contributed to 
anti-coalition radicalization, especially when perceived as being applied 
overbroadly.119  Overbroad detention sweeps risk further radicalizing and 
alienating communities from which terrorists are likely to emerge or whose 
assistance is vital in penetrating or discerning extremist groups.120  
Moreover, several influential studies of counterterrorism strategy have 
emphasized the need to target coercive policies (including military and law 
enforcement efforts) narrowly and precisely to avoid playing into al Qaeda 
propaganda efforts to aggregate local grievances into a common global 
movement.121  Official U.S. military doctrine now cautions about similar 
risks in setting up detention systems in battling insurgencies.122 
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Narrow definitional criteria can therefore help in mitigating an 
Executive’s propensity to over-detain.  Observers from both the right and 
the left worry correctly that in the face of terrorist threats the Executive is 
likely to push detention powers to or even past their legal outer boundaries 
in order to prevent catastrophe as well as head off accusatory political 
backlash for having failed to take sufficient action.123  These are 
fundamentally policy problems, not legal problems, and will require sound 
Executive judgments no matter what the legal regime looks like.  But once 
the role of detention is firmly situated in a broader counterterrorism strategy 
that seeks to balance the many competing policy priorities, a carefully 
drawn administrative detention statute might help restrain this propensity 
toward short-term overreach with long-term strategic drawbacks. 
Considering these liberty and security risks in relation to the four 
preventive purposes outlined above,124 the process of narrowing the class 
subject to proposed administrative detention laws should begin by 
excluding deterrence or information-gathering as the dominant strategic 
driver.  Although both have important roles to play in overall 
counterterrorism strategy,125 the costs of defining detention authority around 
them are likely too high to bear given the alternatives and expected 
benefits. 
As for deterrence, virtually any very dangerous terrorist or terrorism 
supporter the government could target with a deterrence detention strategy 
would either be so committed to violent extremism as to render the 
marginal threat of administrative detention negligible126 or would be 
deterred already by the threat of criminal prosecution or military attack 
(even discounted by a low probability of apprehension).127  The publicity 
and martyrdom imagery surrounding detention might even make it seem 
appealing to some individuals or groups. 
As for information-gathering, an administrative detention law premised 
on detaining individuals with valuable knowledge independent of an 
individual’s nefarious activities sets a precedent too easily overused or 
abused at home or abroad.128  Information-gathering, including through 
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lawful interrogation, will no doubt be a strong motivating objective behind 
almost any administrative detention scheme, and an individual’s knowledge 
about terrorist operations or planning could be a reason not to release 
someone otherwise validly detained (i.e., someone held on grounds 
independent of knowledge).129  But using a person’s suspected knowledge 
alone as the basis for detention and completely delinking detention from an 
individual’s voluntary and purposeful actions cuts even deeper than most 
other administrative detention into traditional civil liberties principles and 
safeguards.130  Even in interpreting Congress’s September 2001 
authorization for the use of military force to include implicitly the power to 
detain “enemy combatants,” the Supreme Court pulled back when it came 
to information-gathering, noting that “[c]ertainly we agree that indefinite 
detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized.”131  
Furthermore, a detention law that allows incarceration based on knowledge 
might very well deter individuals with important information from coming 
forward voluntarily to the government.  Because local community members 
are often best able to discern the affiliations and intentions of terrorists or 
militants embedded in their communities, individual tips are critical to 
identifying genuine threats otherwise invisible among populations.132 
Incapacitation and disruption are likely to be more effective and 
legitimate strategic bases for new administrative detention laws, though 
information-gathering is likely to be an important secondary benefit.133  As 
noted earlier, opponents of administrative detention argue that criminal law 
and other non-detention tools are adequate to incapacitate or disrupt the 
activities of most individuals whom the government would reasonably feel 
compelled to target, while proponents of administrative detention insist that 
the risk of some terrorists slipping through that net is too high.134  Much of 
this debate comes down to differing assessments of the marginal danger 
posed by that remainder.  But, significantly, even opponents of new 
administrative schemes acknowledge that stopping an individual from 
carrying out a terrorist attack (as opposed to merely acquiring information 
or to instill fear) is a legitimate purpose of detention.135  The dispute is over 
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what factual predicate is required and what standards and processes the 
state must utilize to substantiate them.136 
Part V brings this discussion back to these procedural issues. This still 
leaves the question of how, more precisely, Congress should define the 
susceptible detention class in considering an administrative detention 
system.  The ultimate merits of various definitional approaches – such as 
membership, past acts, future dangerousness, or some combination thereof 
– cannot be discerned and calculated independent of the processes and 
standards of proof with which they are paired.  But recent experience and 
some judgments about the future threat of terrorism help narrow the range 
of sensible choices. 
Part III offered some models drawn from other countries with long 
histories of combating terrorism and from other U.S. laws premised on 
incapacitation.  That section further explained that an incapacitation 
strategy points naturally toward a future dangerousness approach to 
defining the class, though proxies such as past acts or membership might 
form part of the inquiry.137  Indeed, requiring some showing of an 
individual’s terrorist activity in addition to indications of future 
dangerousness has the advantage of tying detention more tightly with 
individual moral culpability,138 though this carries the corresponding 
disadvantage of intruding more directly into the traditional province of 
criminal law.  If one thinks that the number of (or threat posed by) 
dangerous terrorists who cannot be prosecuted through criminal trials is 
high, an incapacitation strategic rationale of administrative detention makes 
sense.  But the U.S. experience at Guantánamo, for example, casts some 
doubt on the ability of the government to assess individual dangerousness 
very accurately: On the one hand the government brought many supposedly 
 
 136. An additional worry among administrative detention critics is that building a 
detention system outside the criminal justice system with reduced evidentiary and procedural 
requirements might dramatically undercut the incentive for the government to use 
prosecution.  This concern is valid, though the benefits of justice and finality as well as 
bureaucratic interests might mitigate it.  An administrative detention regime might also build 
in a requirement that the government show that prosecution is impracticable.  The British 
House of Lords considered this issue in Home Department v. E [2007] UKHL 47, at ¶¶14-
16, as both the court and the British government read the control order statute as requiring a 
presumption that prosecution will be used when possible.
 
 137. A great deal of scholarship has focused on the use of individual dangerousness 
assessments in American criminal law and other legal contexts, and the limitations of the 
government’s ability to predict it accurately.  See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE 
UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE, AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING 
CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS (2006); Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, 
Preventive Detention and the Judicial Prediction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural 
Experiment, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415 (1996); Norval Morris & Marc Miller, 
Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 CRIME & JUSTICE 1 (1985); Jonathan Simon, Reversal of 
Fortune: The Resurgence of Individual Risk Assessment in Criminal Justice, 2005 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397. 
 138. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 21, at 47-50. 
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dangerous individuals to Guantánamo who were then released because they 
were later believed not to pose much threat after all; on the other hand, 
some of those released have turned out to be quite dangerous, and have 
reengaged in terrorist activity.139  A key question for those advocating new 
administrative detention proposals for incapacitation is whether accurate 
dangerousness assessments are realistic and what would be necessary to 
improve them. 
A disruption strategy points naturally toward including a “but for” 
standard of dangerousness.  That is, the government would have to show 
that unless the individual is detained, a terrorist attack is likely, perhaps 
very likely.140  Such an approach might effectively limit the detainable class 
to individuals who are either tied to specific plots or are highly central to a 
terrorist organization’s planning.  An advantage of this approach is that it 
would probably be less prone to false positives or overbroad detention than 
a strategy based on dangerousness (depending, of course, on exactly how 
the standard is drawn), because the government would have to show 
evidence not only about the suspect but about his involvement in imminent 
or impending terrorist activities.  A corresponding disadvantage is that such 
a detention system would be severely limited by intelligence – specifically, 
the ability to link individuals to plotting or specific plots in advance.  One 
might also reasonably ask why, if the government is so confident it knows 
who is about to perpetrate a terrorist scheme, can it not arrest and prosecute 
the plotters?  A disruption approach to administrative detention makes 
sense if one believes there is a significant or significantly dangerous set of 
individuals for whom the government is likely to have sufficient 
information to link them to such plotting or plots, yet is also likely to have 
insufficient admissible evidence to support timely use of criminal justice to 
stop them.141 
Both of these definitional approaches – assessments of individual 
dangerousness and showing that an attack is likely to occur without 
administrative detention – look very different from the one based on enemy 
combatancy, certainly as the government has interpreted and used it since 
 
 139. On releases from Guantánamo following later determinations that an individual 
was not an “enemy combatant,” see Press Briefing, Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy, 
Briefing on Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 9, 2004), available at http://www. 
defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2777.  For a specific example of an 
allegedly mistaken detention at Guantánamo, see Carol D. Leonnig, Evidence of Innocence 
Rejected at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2007, at A1.  On detainees released from 
Guantánamo later returning to terrorism, see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Former 
Guantanamo Detainees Who Have Returned to the Fight (July 12, 2007), available at http:// 
www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/DOD_fmrGitmo.pdf; Alissa J. Rubin, 
Former Guantanamo Detainee Tied to Mosul Suicide Attack, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2008, at 
A8. 
 140. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text. 
 141. See the discussion of the limits of criminal prosecutions in dealing with terrorism, 
supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
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2001.142  Indeed, once freed from the need to cast detention in terms of the 
law of war and traditional war powers, past experience and the logic 
underlying most administrative detention proposals caution against using 
“membership” in or “support” for a particular enemy organization or set of 
organizations as the key factual predicate in defining the class. 
A definitional approach such as enemy combatancy, based on 
membership or support to a particular enemy like al Qaeda, is likely to be 
both too broad and too narrow.  As stated earlier, the main reason modern 
forms of terrorism are believed by administrative detention advocates to 
require new detention laws is that the catastrophic harms of attacks require 
recalibrating the balance struck by criminal law between security and 
protection of innocents.  A “membership” or “support” approach to 
administrative detention has already proven prone to overuse against 
individuals who, while perhaps individually dangerous, pose little or no 
threat of major terrorist attack.143  An agency requirement – does the 
individual operate under the effective control of an organization? – makes 
more sense, and actually has more in common with traditional notions of 
enemy combatancy than does mere membership or support.144  At the same 
time, if the ultimate concern is stopping major future terrorist attacks 
(which administrative detention proponents worry will grow more lethal), it 
seems odd to restrict the targeting of administrative detention powers to 
intended perpetrators who are affiliated with groups involved in the 
September 2001 attacks.  This is especially true if al Qaeda and other 
terrorist organizations are likely to become less centralized and more 
dispersed,145 and if massively destructive technologies are likely to become 
more available to them.146  An alternative approach would have Congress 
designate on an ongoing basis which terrorist organizations pose sufficient 
 
 142. As mentioned earlier, the Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantánamo 
define “enemy combatant” as: 
An individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or 
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners.  This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act 
or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces. 
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, supra note 26, at ¶a.
 
 143. And, as explained earlier, it may inadvertently play into the hands of al Qaeda 
propaganda efforts.  See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
 
 144. Judge Wilkinson adopts a similar interpretation of “enemy combatant” in Al-Marri 
v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 244 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (concurring in part and dissenting 
in part), when he reasons that to be classified as an enemy combatant a person must “(1) be a 
member of (2) an organization or nation against whom Congress has declared war or 
authorized the use of military force, and (3) knowingly plans or engages in conduct that 
harms or aims to harm persons or property for the purpose of furthering the military goals of 
the enemy nation or organization.”  See supra note 23 (describing the Supreme Court’s 
March 6, 2009, order directing that Al-Marri be dismissed as moot). 
 145. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 146. See BOBBITT, supra note 75, at 446-452, 478-480. 
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threats that their members – or, better, their agents – are subject to the 
administrative detention statute.147 
The key point is that whether proposed administrative detention laws 
aim primarily at long-term incapacitation or immediate-term disruption, a 
more effective definitional approach would tie the target class quite directly 
to the specific strategic aim by including, for example, a high substantive 
standard of prospective or “but for” dangerousness.  This could include 
additional proxy indicators or required congressional designations likely to 
improve the accuracy of adjudications and to check reflexive expansion of 
the target class.148 
V.   FROM WHY AND WHOM TO HOW 
Having considered the issue of whom new legal powers might aim to 
detain, any consideration of administrative detention statutes should be 
grounded in a firm conception of “why detain?” because that strategic 
rationale will inform significantly the logic of procedural design – the how 
issues. 
Near the outset we noted that there is an emerging consensus among 
administrative detention reform advocates around a set of minimum 
procedural and institutional elements found in most proposals: judicial 
review, adversarial process, and transparency.149  After Boumediene, it is 
also fairly clear that robust judicial review and opportunity to contest the 
legal and factual basis for detention are also constitutionally required, at 
least for detainees held inside the United States and those at Guantánamo.150 
Beyond identifying such minimum elements, however, it is difficult to 
work out the secondary details of procedural design without knowing more 
precisely what a new administrative detention scheme aims to achieve and 
 
 147. David Cole offers a formula along similar lines, suggesting that Congress could 
authorize and regulate law-of-war preventive detention for fighters only of those terrorist 
groups against which Congress has expressly acknowledged a state of armed conflict.  See 
Cole, supra note 52.  Some might argue that the 2001 Authorization of the Use of Military 
Force did just that with respect to al Qaeda.  Specifically, it authorized “all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”  
2001 Authorization of the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §2(a), 115 Stat. 224.  
Congress could pass additional resolutions to take account of new threats or repeal 
resolutions to take account of diminished threats. 
 148. Besides these definitional standards themselves, there are other ways to restrict the 
class of individuals susceptible to new administrative laws.  Detention of an individual might 
require an additional showing of prior terrorism-related acts, or it might require showing that 
less-coercive means than detention could not alleviate the risk.  The more such protections 
are added, however, the less useful administrative detention becomes over other legal tools 
like criminal prosecution. 
 149. See supra Part I. 
 150. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
 
2009] WHY DETAIN, AND DETAIN WHOM?  33 
 
whom it is built to detain.  Greater strategic clarity and a sharper idea of 
how the substantive detention class might be defined therefore enlighten 
this procedural discussion and reveal important additional questions of 
institutional design. 
Consider first the issue of judicial review combined with adversarial 
process.  The U.S. legal system generally exalts these features because they 
are believed to promote both fairness and accuracy.151  Whatever the test or 
factual predicate used to justify detention as part of a counterterrorism 
strategy (dangerousness? proximity to a plot? knowledge of terrorist 
activities? something else?), effective administrative detention ought to 
involve adjudicative mechanisms likely to produce accurate and fair 
determinations of that particular factual predicate. 
If, for example, the dominant strategic purpose is incapacitation and the 
critical detention test is therefore dangerousness, we should strive for 
hearings designed to assess and predict accurately future behavior, with 
adjudicators who have access to information relevant to that inquiry and 
processes that effectively test the quality of that specific sort of 
information.152  True, regular federal judges make similar dangerousness 
determinations based on adversarial hearings all the time (take the example 
cited above of bail conditions while awaiting trial).153  But terrorist 
dangerousness is different from criminal dangerousness in both kind and 
degree154 and requires understanding not just an individual’s probable 
 
 151. See Jay Sterling Silver, Equality of Arms and the Adversarial Process: A New 
Constitutional Right, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1007, 1008 (“our system of justice is founded on the 
presumption that the truth is more likely to emerge from the contest between zealous 
advocates”).  This argument formed the basis of opposition to some provisions in the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Title X, §1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 
2741-2743 (2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §2241(2) (West Supp. 2008)), 
restricting habeas corpus jurisdiction at Guantánamo.  See, e.g., P. Sabin Willett, Detainees 
Deserve Court Trials, Op-Ed., WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2005, at A21.  But others observe that 
adversarial process may sometimes suppress truth-finding.  See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The 
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (1975) (“many of the 
rules and devices of adversary litigation as we conduct it are not geared for, but are often 
aptly suited to defeat, the development of the truth”); Frank J. Macciarola, Finding the Truth 
in an American Criminal Trial: Some Observations, 5 CARDOZO J. INTL & COMP. L. 97 
(1997) (observing that the American criminal justice system often subordinates truth to other 
values). 
 152. Procedural due process cases are illustrative here.  Compare, e.g., Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring evidentiary hearings in situation where veracity and 
credibility of claimants is key), with Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (refusing to require 
judicial-style hearings for certain juvenile civil commitments because they were unlikely to 
improve practice of relying on medical expert submissions). 
 153. Cf. Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (noting that right to counsel 
and adversarial process mandated in the Bail Reform Act were “specifically designed to 
further the accuracy of [the] determination [of the likelihood of future dangerousness]”). 
 154. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.  Those who believe that terrorism 
should be treated as crime may disagree with this point, but other ways in which terrorist 
dangerousness generally differs from criminal dangerousness include its strategic purpose, 
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activities and the magnitude of his threat but how his activities relate to 
fellow terrorists’ activities.  If the dangerousness test includes a further 
inquiry into whether less liberty-restrictive means can mitigate the threat (as 
the British Lords have required of recent British counterterrorism laws),155 
courts would further need to inquire of and assess the effectiveness of an 
array of government tools, including monitoring and surveillance and 
international cooperative efforts.  These latter inquiries seem better suited 
to a specialized court (perhaps a “national security court”), so that judges 
can accumulate experience and expertise in these technical and operational 
matters.156  The same is probably true for disruption detention decisions, 
which would require judicial understanding of functional linkages between 
a suspect and terrorist organizations, as well as judicial decisionmaking 
under extreme time pressures.  The success of France’s counterterrorism 
efforts is sometimes credited in part to its development of a specialized, 
centralized terrorism court, because that country allowed its magistrates to 
become “the type of expert on the subject of terrorism that is difficult to 
create within normal judicial institutions.”157 
If, by contrast, the substantive standard for incapacitation detention is 
not future dangerousness itself but whether a suspect committed certain acts 
or is a member of a particular group (perhaps as proxies for dangerousness), 
this again starts to look very much like an inquiry that regular courts 
ordinarily conduct, using common analytical tools and types of evidence, 
though perhaps with special provisions for classified information.  There is 
little reason why an act or membership inquiry could not be handled as 
effectively by regular, generalist judges as by a special court. 
In similar ways the choice among strategic imperatives behind 
administrative detention points to different approaches to attorney 
assistance.158  The nature of information used to prove or disprove the 
urgent need for detention in a disruption or information-gathering regime 
 
individual motivation, and long-term as well as short-term consequences. 
 155. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 102-111 (H.L.).
 
 156. See Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3; Kenneth Anderson, Law and Terror, 
POLICY REV., Oct. 2006, at 1.
 
 157. Jeremy Shapiro & Benedicte Suzan, The French Experience of Counter-
Terrorism, SURVIVAL, Mar. 2003, at 67, 78, available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/ 
articles/fellows/shapiro20030301.pdf; see also GARAPON, supra note 50, at 5-6.  The 
Constitution Project takes issue with this view in arguing against national security courts: 
“unlike tax and patent law, there is simply no highly specialized expertise that would form 
relevant selection criteria for the judges.”  A CRITIQUE OF “NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS,” 
supra note 4, at 3.  See also Coughenour, supra note 1 (arguing that federal judges have 
adequate expertise to handle complex terrorism cases).
 
 158. While assistance of counsel is generally believed to enhance truth-finding, in some 
circumstances the Supreme Court has found it does not contribute significantly to decision 
making accuracy.  See, e.g., Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 
(1985) (rejecting due process challenge to federal statute limiting fees payable to lawyers 
representing veterans’ benefit claimants); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 
(1981) (holding that Constitution does not require appointment of counsel for indigent 
parents in every parental status termination proceeding). 
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(which requires knowing a great deal about terrorist organizations as a 
whole) might also be better understood and handled by a dedicated bar of 
specialist attorneys with clearance and access to highly sensitive 
intelligence, as some administrative detention advocates have proposed.159  
The need for restricting attorney choice in a comparatively transparent and 
less time-sensitive incapacitation regime will likely be significantly lower. 
Besides judicial and representational structure, the strategic purpose of 
administrative detention and the corresponding definition of the substantive 
class will also guide other aspects of institutional design, including 
appropriate duration of detention and whether ongoing, periodic review is 
warranted.  If administrative detention is focused on incapacitation and 
therefore defines the class by dangerousness, or on a proxy such as past acts 
or membership in a group, individual detentions would logically last as long 
as that condition exists – that is, as long as the individual poses that danger.  
But whereas dangerousness itself may change over time (as events pass, 
plots are thwarted, or as a detainee grows older or perhaps even 
demonstrates regret or a decision to cooperate), conditions such as 
membership or past actions do not.160  A factual assessment like the former 
therefore probably merits periodic review,161 while assessing static 
conditions such as the latter does not (though it still may warrant time 
limitations on detention). 
In contrast to an incapacitation regime that would probably include 
long-term detention, a disruption-based administrative detention system 
could be effective with very short-term detentions; indeed, merely arresting 
then releasing a terrorist plot member might cause his collaborators to stand 
down.162  And relatively short-term detentions might satisfy most 
information-collection requirements163 but would provide little deterrent 
threat to would-be terrorist collaborators. 
Finally, the way strategic purposes and the subject class of individuals 
 
 159. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3. 
 160. Israel’s Unlawful Enemy Combatant Statute, discussed at supra note 97 and 
accompanying text, requires re-examination of the need for continued detention every six 
months.  See Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002 (Isr.), available at 32 
ISRAELI Y.B. HUM. RTS. 389 (2002) and at http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/7E86 D0 
98-0463-4F37-A38D-8AEBE770BDE6/0/IncarcerationLawedited140302.doc. 
 161. See Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 3; Wittes & Gitenstein, supra note 2, at 12; 
see also Waxman, supra note 20.
 
 162. The Spanish government, for example, uses criminal investigatory detention 
powers – sometimes for very brief periods – in similar ways. See Victoria Burnett, After 
Raids, 14 Held in Spain on Suspicion of a Terror Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2008, at A3;  see 
also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 50, at §VI, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/ 
node/62151/section/7 (detailing France’s use of broad arrest powers to disrupt terrorist 
plotting).
 
 163. But see Declaration of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, supra note 72 (explaining 
that intelligence collection through interrogation may take months or years to bear fruit in 
some cases, especially when the suspect is trained to resist interrogation). 
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are defined also drives the logic of decision-making transparency.  An 
incapacitation strategy is compatible with high levels of public scrutiny, 
since there will usually be little reason to hide – and indeed much to gain 
from disclosing openly – the underlying justification for a detention.164  
Some degree of transparency would be critical to a deterrence strategy as 
well, to the extent locking up individuals aims to dissuade others from 
certain specific conduct. 
But the transparency of disruption-detention is more problematic, 
because the government may not wish to tip off other plot collaborators or 
cause public panic.  Some European countries, for example, have laws that 
allow individuals otherwise legally detained to be held incommunicado for 
brief periods if cutting off communications (and sometimes even lawyer 
access) is necessary to thwart terrorist attacks.165  And information-
collection detention would require high levels of secrecy to avoid disclosing 
sensitive intelligence or tipping off the targets of possible stings.166 
In any terrorist administrative detention system there will likely be a 
need to safeguard sensitive intelligence information from public 
dissemination, but in the cases of detention for disruption or information-
gathering the very proceedings themselves might need to be at least 
temporarily shielded from disclosure.167  Such administrative detention 
regimes might therefore have a greater need for closed or perhaps even ex 
parte hearings (perhaps analogous to hearings by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court)168 than would a system designed for incapacitation or 
deterrence. 
This analysis points to an incapacitation regime and a disruption regime 
– the two most promising strategic approaches to administrative detention 
outlined above – with very different designs.169  An incapacitation system 
could quite naturally feature generalist judges and lawyers conducting open 
and transparent hearings to regulate what would often be long-term 
 
 164. On the strategic benefits of detention decision-making transparency, see Waxman, 
supra note 20. 
 165. See Anna Oehmichen, Incommunicado Detention in Germany: An Example of 
Reactive Anti-terror Legislation and Long-term Consequences, 9 GERMAN L. J. 855 (2008), 
available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol09No07/PDF_Vol_09_No_07_855-
888_Articles_Oehmichen.pdf.  These laws have come under significant scrutiny and legal 
challenge.  See id. 
 166. See Remarks by Attorney General Mukasey, supra note 8 (emphasizing the risks 
of disclosing sensitive intelligence through processes to challenge detention). 
 167. For a view critical of secrecy in such contexts, see STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE 
ENEMY WITHIN 12-14 (2002). 
 168. See 50 U.S.C.A. §1803 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).  Generally speaking, the FISC, 
established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-
511, 92 Stat. 1783, oversees requests for surveillance orders against suspected foreign 
intelligence agents and terrorists inside the United States. 
 169. See supra notes 124-132 and accompanying text (explaining that incapacitation 
and disruption are likely more strategically promising preventive detention approaches than 
deterrence or information gathering). 
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detention.  A disruption system might require specialized courts and 
lawyers operating to regulate short-term detention amid some secrecy.  
There may therefore be a need to choose between strategic approaches in 
fashioning a new law, or to consider a bifurcated system to handle the two 
types of detention. 
The broader point is that effective procedural design is not independent 
of strategic purpose or the substantive definition of the detention class.  It is 
heavily driven by both. 
CONCLUSION 
This article began by explaining its purpose not to answer definitively 
whether new administrative detention laws are needed or to offer a detailed 
legislative road map, but rather to recast the terrorist detention discussion in 
terms of purpose and substance before turning to procedure and institutions.  
Most of the administrative detention debate moves too quickly to 
procedural design.  This risks missing major pieces of the puzzle, including 
a clear appreciation of the specific marginal benefits and risks of various 
detention strategies and proposed legal reforms.  An administrative 
detention system’s legitimacy and effectiveness – measured in terms of 
both liberty and security – will depend at least as much on its purpose and 
substantive standards as on its procedures. 
Those proposing new administrative detention laws have been tempted 
to take as the starting point existing enemy combatant detention policies 
and to build onto them more robust and refined procedural protections.  
Instead, reform proposals should consider narrower categories designed to 
incapacitate the most dangerous suspects or disrupt imminent plots.  
Working more methodically through the why and whom questions helps 
illuminate the dangers of vague or broadly defined detention criteria and 
sharpens the image of how more narrowly crafted administrative detention 
could operate. 
